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ABSTRACT
We consider IPO firms from 1970 to 2001 and examine the evolution of their insider ownership over
time to understand better why and how U.S. firms that become widely held do so. In our sample, a
majority of firms has insider ownership below 20% after ten years. We find that a firm's stock market
performance and trading play an extremely important role in its insider ownership dynamics. Firms
that experience large decreases in insider ownership and/or become widely held are firms with high
valuations, good recent stock market performance, and liquid markets for their stocks. In contrast
and surprisingly, variables suggested by agency theory have limited success in explaining the
evolution of insider ownership.
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Most firms start their life with concentrated ownership. Yet, the typical large established U.S. firm 
has fairly dispersed ownership. How do firms evolve so that many of them end up with dispersed 
ownership? Why does that evolution take place? There has been much recent research on the 
determinants of insider or managerial ownership.
1 However, this research focuses on understanding why, 
at a point in time, insiders or managers own a larger fraction of shares in some firms than in others. The 
evolution of ownership as firms mature has not been the object of much study in the U.S.
2 As a result, we 
know little about the dynamics of insider ownership following a firm’s IPO. In this paper, we attempt to 
understand these dynamics better.  
The stylized fact that large U.S. corporations are much more likely to have dispersed ownership than 
comparable corporations in most other countries (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999, 
LLS) plays a central role in much of modern corporate finance. In the U.S., observers since Berle and 
Means (1932) have been concerned that diffuse ownership facilitates entrenchment by managers and 
these concerns have led to a large literature on agency costs and governance. An intense controversy has 
evolved over the issue of whether firms in which managers own more shares perform better and have 
higher valuations (see Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia, 1999, Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001, and 
McConnell, Servaes, and Lins, 2005). Cross-country comparisons of corporate ownership raise the 
question of what it is that makes the U.S. and a few other countries unique in having dispersed ownership. 
Is it differences in politics, as argued by Roe (2003)? Or is it because of better legal protection of 
investors, as argued by LLS? A recent paper by Becht and de Long (2005) concludes with the statement: 
“We wish that we knew.” Investigating the dynamics of ownership following a firm’s IPO in the U.S. 
should help us understand better these issues.  
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) for recent papers 
that make ownership structure endogenous.  
2 One paper that follows ownership beyond the years immediately following the IPO is Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah 
(1997). Their focus differs from ours. Though they document the evolution of insider ownership for firms with IPOs 
from 1980 through 1983 for the ten years following the IPO, they are mostly concerned about how ownership 
explains performance.      2
We follow a large sample of firms over time to understand why and how their ownership becomes 
more dispersed following their IPO. Our database includes all firms that have an IPO from 1970 to 2001. 
We are able to follow the ownership of these firms from 1986 through 2001. LLS consider two 
definitions of widely held firms. With their first definition, a firm is widely held if there is no controlling 
blockholder who owns more than 20% of the votes. Rather than focusing on the largest blockholder, we 
consider the holdings of the officers and directors of the firm, whom we call insiders as is common 
practice, so that a firm meets the 20% standard when its insiders own less than 20% of the shares. We find 
with our dataset that insiders control less than 20% of the cash flow rights in half the firms ten years after 
their IPO. With this measure, therefore, the road to diffuse ownership is quick for the typical firm. The 
more restrictive definition of diffuse ownership used by LLS is that there is no controlling blockholder 
who owns more than 10% of the votes. Strikingly, insiders own less than 10% of the shares in roughly a 
quarter of the firms five years after their IPO. However, the 10% standard is one that is not met by the 
typical firm in our sample in any year within thirty years of its IPO. Because our sample drops in size 
over time, so that by thirty years, less than 3% of the IPO firms are still in the sample, it is difficult for us 
to evaluate when half the firms eventually meet this stricter standard.   
Insider ownership is defined as the ratio of shares held by insiders over the total number of shares the 
firm has outstanding. Insider ownership can therefore fall because the numerator of the ratio falls or the 
denominator increases. Increases in the denominator take place when the firm issues shares to raise cash, 
to pay for acquisitions, to deliver shares upon exercise of stock options and warrants, and conversion of 
convertible debt. As long as the participation of insiders in equity issues is less than their proportional 
holdings of shares, their proportional ownership drops when new shares are issued. 
In a study for the U.K., Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2004) find that increases in the number of shares 
due to mergers play a central role in ownership dilution in the U.K.  We find that the evolution of 
ownership in our sample is different: sales of shares by insiders are as important, on average, in 
explaining the decrease in insider ownership as issuance of new shares by the firm.  Further, share issues   3
in primary offerings and to pay for mergers constitute only a fraction of the increase in shares for our 
firms. This result could be at least partly explained by the importance of option compensation in the U.S.
3   
Insiders reduce their ownership of the firm when the costs of doing so are less than the benefit. The 
benefit is that insiders can diversify their portfolio and grow the firm faster because firm growth is less 
dependent on their co-investment. The costs are that the value of the shares falls if insiders control a 
smaller share of cash flows than the firm value maximizing ownership share. To the extent that insiders 
care about control separately from the value of their stake, a reduction in their proportional holdings also 
decreases their ability to influence the decisions of the firm and to resist takeovers. The literature has 
several theories that help understand why optimal holdings by insiders may fall as a firm matures so that 
it becomes worthwhile for insiders to reduce their fractional holdings of a firm’s shares. These theories 
are not mutually exclusive, so that we would not be surprised to find some support for each, but we want 
to investigate whether some of these theories describe the data better than others. 
The main ideas found in the literature can be summarized as follows: 
 
1) Moral hazard. From Jensen and Meckling (1976) onward, agency theory predicts that ownership 
will be more concentrated when controlling insiders find it easier to take advantage of outside or 
minority shareholders. Corporate insiders have a multitude of ways to benefit from their control of the 
firm and make the stake of minority shareholders worth less. The literature has focused on shirking, 
perk consumption, investment choice, and tunneling as the main vehicles for insiders to benefit from 
their control position.
4 As the ownership of insiders increases, their actions become better aligned 
with the interests of minority shareholders but they also bear more risk. With this agency view, we 
would expect firms to become widely held for two reasons. First, some types of agency problems 
                                                 
3 See Fama and French (2005) for evidence that option exercises can substantially increase the number of shares 
outstanding.  
4 See, for instance, Shleifer and Vishny (1997).    4




2) Adverse selection. Leland and Pyle (1977) model retention of shares by insiders as a signal of firm 
quality when information asymmetries are high. As shown by Myers and Majluf (1984), if insiders 
maximize the wealth of existing shareholders, they will choose to sell equity only if they can do so at 
an advantageous price. This adverse selection makes it expensive to sell shares when information 
asymmetries are important. Maug (2001) and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) point out that it 
becomes advantageous for firms to have outside shareholders, and hence to have more dispersed 
ownership, when information from outside the firm becomes more important to managers in making 
their decisions. With these models, more dispersed ownership becomes advantageous when the 
informational advantage of insiders becomes less important. We would therefore expect firms to 
become widely held when more is known about them and information asymmetries have become less 
important. 
 
3) Timing. There are two strands of research in the literature that imply insiders would be concerned 
about the market for the firm’s shares when they choose to increase the supply of shares available for 
trading, either through sales of their own shares or through issuance of new shares. First, a number of 
authors argue that it pays for firms to time the sale of new shares when they are advantageously 
priced (window of opportunity hypothesis).
6 Since insiders decide when the firm sells shares, they 
can also time sales for their own account. The evidence of Clarke, Dunbar, and Kahle (2004) on 
secondary equity issues is consistent with the ability of insiders to gain from the timing of the sale of 
                                                 
5 See Fama and Jensen (1983).  
6 See Baker and Wurgler (2002). Schultz (2003), Pastor and Veronesi (2005), and Benninga, Helmantel, and Sarig 
(2005) review the evidence for IPOs and provide models of timing that rely on the efficient market hypothesis. 
Baker and Stein (2004) review evidence for SEOs and propose a model of timing that does not rely on the efficient 
market hypothesis.   5
their shares. Second, there is a literature claiming that the demand for shares can be downward-
sloping, in which case making more shares available for trading would lead to a decrease in price.
7 
When the market for shares for a firm becomes deeper and more liquid, the demand for shares 
becomes more elastic, so that it becomes less costly for insiders to sell shares in the market. Empirical 
evidence shows that the cost of selling a block of shares for a small firm can be large.
8  
          
We investigate how the variables that are influential in these theories play a role in the evolution of 
insider ownership for firms and in the process whereby some firms become widely held and others not. 
We use two different approaches. First, we examine the determinants of significant decreases in insider 
ownership, where we define a significant decrease in insider ownership to be a decrease of at least 5%. 
Second, we estimate a hazard rate model of becoming widely held. We estimate this model for the two 
definitions of widely-held firms used by LLS.  
We find that stock market variables play an extremely important role in the process that leads firms to 
become widely held. First, firms with greater stock market turnover are more likely to see the ownership 
share of insiders fall and are more likely to become widely held. Second, firms with high book-to-market 
ratios are less likely to see an increase in ownership dispersion. Third, the likelihood that insiders will 
decrease their ownership share significantly increases with the firm’s recent stock market performance. 
Hence, firms move towards dispersed ownership when the market for their shares is liquid in the sense 
that a large block of shares can be sold without too much of a discount. Strikingly, the moral hazard and 
information asymmetry variables seem to be largely irrelevant in predicting large changes in insider 
ownership. This is even more so in a regression where we use lagged changes for most of the explanatory 
variables. In that regression, ownership is expected to decrease significantly when it is high and when the 
stock has performed well.  
                                                 
7 Bagwell (1991) reviews the literature and discusses the implications of downward-sloping demand curves for 
corporate finance. The more recent literature combines diversity of opinion with limits of arbitrage. See, for 
instance, Baker, Coval, and Stein (2005) for a model and a review of the evidence.  
8 See Keim and Madhavan (1996), for instance.   6
The moral hazard and information asymmetry variables are slightly more informative in the hazard 
models that predict whether a firm is likely to become widely held in a particular year. The hazard models 
predict that firms are more likely to meet the 10% threshold in a given year after not having met it if they 
have VC financing, are large, have a low book-to-market ratio, have low cash flow, report R&D 
expenditures, have low leverage, have low volatility, have high lagged and contemporaneous stock 
returns, and have high turnover. Stock return volatility is often used as a proxy for information 
asymmetries and agency problems, but high stock return volatility also makes it costly for insiders to have 
a large stake. Our evidence suggests that the latter effect is less important than the former. We would 
expect R&D to make it less likely that a firm becomes widely held, so that its coefficient in the hazard 
model is surprising. We find no evidence that firms with more hard assets are more likely to become 
widely held, which seems inconsistent with the moral hazard and information asymmetry theories.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present our database. We explain its construction and 
provide summary statistics for cohorts of IPO firms. In Section 3, we investigate the evolution of inside 
ownership and the time it takes for firms to become widely-held in our sample using the definitions from 
LLS. In Section 4, we examine the determinants of large changes in ownership. We also show how these 
changes take place. In Section 5, we provide estimates of hazard models of firms going from being 
concentrated to being widely held. We conclude in Section 6.  
 
2.   Data 
Our analysis involves tracking the evolution of firms’ insider ownership as they mature. This exercise 
is more sensibly done using firms’ data from the time of the IPO onward, given that it is quite difficult for 
the insiders to sell shares in any major way while the firm is still private.
9  We identify IPOs using data 
from 1970 through 2001 provided by Securities Data Corporation (SDC).  We include only common 
                                                 
9 This is particularly true if we count venture capitalists as insiders, which is highly likely given that they often hold 
a seat on the board of directors.   7
stock offerings and we eliminate any IPOs in SDC that are flagged as reverse LBOs, spinoffs, rights 
offerings, or unit offerings. This process leaves us with 9,057 IPOs.   
SDC data on IPOs are matched with CRSP using 6-digit cusips. Based on SIC codes reported in 
CRSP, we also exclude regulated utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949) and financial institutions (SIC codes in 
the 6000 range), on the assumption that the relation between fundamental characteristics and firm 
ownership differ for these firms because of regulatory constraints.
10 In cases where trading prices are 
available on CRSP prior to the IPO date reported by SDC, we exclude the firm, on the assumption that the 
IPO information is incorrect.  Because our sample dates to 1970 and includes many NASDAQ firms, we 
allow a firm to be in the data even if its first price in CRSP is substantially after the IPO.  Otherwise, 
CRSP coverage of NASDAQ firms, which begins in 1972, would greatly reduce the sample. This 
procedure yields a total 6,319 IPO firms. We match SDC data to CRSP daily and monthly returns data 
and use CRSP to obtain data on prices, returns, share volume, and shares outstanding.   
We obtain data on insider ownership from Compact Disclosure, which is a CD-Rom product that is 
produced each month. Compact Disclosure attempts to provide information on all firms that file with the 
SEC and have assets in excess of $5 million. Because the differential information in each CD-Rom from 
one month to the next is fairly small and we do not have access to all the CDs, we only use the October 
CDs to produce the dataset.  We have October CDs available from 1987 to 2002.
11 Compact Disclosure 
contains text versions of SEC filings and has the ability to create summary reports of many variables.  
The main variable of interest for our analysis is the ratio of insiders’ holdings of common shares over 
total shares outstanding (obtained from CRSP). Insiders are defined as officers and directors of the firm in 
Compact Disclosure.  Our insider ownership variable is therefore the same as the one used, for instance, 
in Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999). Obviously, our ownership data is only as good as the proxy 
                                                 
10 See Demsetz and Lehn (1985) for evidence of the importance of regulation for corporate ownership.  
11 For 1988 and 1995, we sample ownership in November instead of in October, and for 1987 we use the CD from   
January 1988.   8
data reported to the SEC.  The proxy data may lead us to understate inside ownership if insiders disavow 
blocks they effectively control.  
Researchers have compared ownership data from Compact Disclosure to ownership data from other 
data sources as well as from proxies. Anderson and Lee (1997) find that Corporate Text dominates 
Compact Disclosure as a data source, but these two data sources are better than Spectrum or Value Line. 
The disadvantage of Corporate Text for our study is that it covers primarily NYSE and AMEX firms 
before 1995 and is therefore unsuitable for our sample, in which NYSE-listed firms represent only 15% of 
our firm-years. Anderson and Lee (1997) conclude that the advantage of Corporate Text over Compact 
Disclosure is due to a significant extent to firms with dual class shares. In the reported results, we use 
firms with dual class shares. We investigate whether our results are affected by these firms. As Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2004) point out, there is no easy way to identify dual-class firms. To identify these 
firms in our sample, we follow their method and classify as dual-class firms those firms that have 
multiple CUSIP numbers that differ in their 7
th and 8
th digits.
12 Our sample includes 5.94% of firm-year 
observations from firms that have dual class shares according to this criterion. We estimate our 
regressions without these firms and find that our results are not affected by them. While Anderson and 
Lee (1997) use a panel of firms for 1992, McConnell, Servaes, and Lins (2005) compare ownership from 
Compact Disclosure to ownership obtained directly from proxies for a sample of 200 randomly selected 
firms from 1992 through 1997. They find that the correlation coefficient between the two ownership 
sources is 0.92.  
Compact Disclosure reports the number of shares held by insiders as of a certain date and it also 
reports shares outstanding, but the latter is often as of another date.  When Compact Disclosure reports 
the proxy date, we obtain the total number of shares from CRSP for the same month as the date of the 
                                                 
12 They use two additional criteria. One uses new issues from SDC and the other uses information from the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC).    9
proxy. If Compact Disclosure reports more than one proxy date, we take the latest date reported.
13 For 
example, if a CD-Rom dated October 1993 has two proxy filings, one from March 1993 and another from 
March 1992, as well as a 10-K from June 1993, we assume the ownership data are as of March 1993. 
Since for a typical (October) CD, the latest proxy date is either from the beginning of the corresponding 
year or from December of the previous year, we assign the ownership information to the previous 
calendar year. In the above example, we assume that ownership for the 1992 calendar year is given by the 
data of March 1993.
14  
Our sample of insider ownership data spans the years 1986-2001.  Consequently, we are able to track 
ownership from 1986 onward. The insider ownership of a firm that had an IPO in 1972 would therefore 
be tracked from 1986. For some firms we can track ownership from the time of the IPO onward for more 
than a decade.  For other firms, the first year of ownership data may be up to 16 years after the IPO. 
Compact Disclosure is matched to CRSP using 6-digit cusips.  Once the ownership data and CRSP 
are matched, we match this data to the IPO data via cusips.  Our final sample contains 5,281 firms for 
which at least one year of Compustat data and ownership data are available. 
Table 1 provides information on our sample for different IPO years. Not surprisingly, the number of 
IPOs varies sharply over time. We have a large number of IPOs in the first few years of the sample 
period, but then there is a dramatic lull in the IPO market until the early 1980s. The market slows down 
towards the late 1980s before rebounding again in the early 1990s.  It slows down sharply at the end of 
our sample period. For the IPOs before 1986, we lose a large number of observations when we require 
CRSP data and then many more observations when we merge with Compact Disclosure. The latter is 
mostly due to the fact many IPO firms from the 1970s and early 1980s do not survive until 1986, the first 
                                                 
13 This matching procedure results in insiders owning more than 100% of the shares for 549 firm-years out of 27,512 
firm-years. We eliminate these cases in our analysis. 
14 If Compact Disclosure doesn't report a proxy date for a particular firm but it reports insider ownership for that 
firm, we compute the insider ownership share as the ratio of the number of shares held by insiders over the number 
of shares outstanding at the end of the previous year. For instance, if the October 1993 CR-Rom reports insider 
ownership without a proxy date, we divide insider ownership by shares outstanding at the end of 1992 and use that 
ratio as our insider ownership measure for 1992.    10
year with information about insider ownership. As a result, for the 1970s, we lose more than three-
quarters of the IPO firms. After 1986, we still lose a substantial number of firms when we merge with 
CRSP and drop utilities and financial firms, but merging with Compact Disclosure has a minimal impact 
on sample size.  
We use data from SDC to determine if an IPO is venture-backed.  SDC is also the source of data on 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and mergers (especially those involving stock swaps).  We also rely on 
daily data in CRSP to obtain estimates of idiosyncratic volatility from market model regressions, the 
exchange on which the firm is listed, and for calculating the daily turnover of the NYSE firms and of the 
Nasdaq firms.  All remaining data are obtained from Compustat. 
 
3. When do firms become widely held?   
In this section, we investigate the path to dispersed ownership for the firms in our sample. We 
conduct our investigation using two different samples: the continuous ownership data sample and the 
whole sample.  The continuous sample includes firms with continuous ownership data from the IPO to the 
year when they have their first missing observation or the year when they first become widely held.
15  By 
construction, this sample includes firms with IPOs from 1986 onward. Though many of our results use 
only the continuous sample, we also report some results that use all our firms, including firms that had 
their IPO between 1970 and 1985 and for which ownership data is available only after 1985.  This sample 
(we call it the whole sample) uses data from any IPO firm that has data on Compustat, CRSP, and 
Compact Disclosure. The benefit of using the whole sample is that it allows us to track ownership of 
firms up to 31 years after their IPO. In contrast, a firm in the continuous sample can be tracked no more 
than 16 years from its IPO.  
Figure 1 shows the distribution of insider ownership changes for firms in the whole sample. It is 
immediately obvious that many more changes in ownership are negative than positive. The mean change 
                                                 
15 We also use a sample where we add firms to the continuous sample that have gaps in their data not exceeding two 
years. Our results also hold for this sample.    11
in ownership is -2.07% per firm-year and the median is -0.30%. Both figures are statistically different 
from zero.  The distribution is only slightly skewed to the left (the skewness is -0.37) and has high 
kurtosis (14.52).   
Table 2 also uses the whole sample. It provides statistics on insider ownership in event time starting 
with the first year following the IPO. For instance, we find that in year 5 after the IPO the median insider 
ownership is 21.11%. It is interesting to note that the comparable figure for that year reported by 
Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1997) is 28.6%, substantially higher than our estimate, but their median 
ownership after 10 years is 17.9%, which is very close to our estimate of 18.33%. Our estimate is based 
on a sample with roughly 15 times as many observations as their sample of IPOs from 1980 through 
1983. Another useful benchmark for our ownership data is the work of Holderness, Krozner, and Sheehan 
(1999). They examine insider ownership across 4,200 exchange-listed firms in 1995. They find that 
average insider holdings are 21% and median insider holdings are 14%. Consequently, the average and 
median insider holdings of our IPO firms match the average and median of the population after 25 years.  
Viewed from this perspective, it takes a long time for the ownership of IPO firms to look like the 
ownership of the population of firms.  
Average insider ownership is 38.22% at the end of the first year after the IPO and falls steadily over 
time, nearly dropping in half over thirty years. However, the sample size falls sharply over time. While 
we have 3,878 firms in year 1, we end up having only 70 firms in year 30. The second column provides 
the 25
th percentile of the distribution. We see that by year 5, a quarter of the sample’s ownership level is 
below the 10% threshold. The level of ownership for this percentile drops by almost three quarters over 
thirty years. The median holdings fall more quickly than the mean holdings, indicating that the 
distribution of ownership is skewed to the right. The 75
th percentile falls less sharply than the 25
th 
percentile, since it drops by less than half over thirty years.  
LLS call firms widely held if the controlling shareholder controls less than 10% of the votes with one 
threshold or less than 20% of the votes with the other. Our ownership measure is slightly different since   12
we focus on ownership of cash flow rights by insiders. We follow their approach and compute the fraction 
of firms where insiders own less than 10% of cash flow rights (WH10) and the fraction of firms where 
they hold less than 20% (WH20). We find that only one firm in 8 meets the 10% standard and slightly 
more than one firm in 5 meets the 20% standard at the end of the year after the IPO. This shows that using 
these thresholds it is infrequent for a firm to be widely held shortly after its IPO. However, the fraction of 
firms that are widely held grows steadily. With the 20% standard, the median firm is widely held shortly 
before year 10. For the 10% standard, it takes much longer for the median firm to be widely held. In fact, 
after 30 years, the median firm is not widely held, but after that the number of firms in our sample 
becomes quite small and hence not useful to reach robust conclusions. It follows from Table 2 that firms 
become widely held fairly quickly on average using a 20% standard, but not using a 10% standard. In 
light of the results of Holderness, Krozner, and Sheehan (1999), this may not be surprising since median 
firm ownership is higher than 10% in their sample of 1995 firms. Nevertheless, close to one third of firms 
are widely held after the tenth year following their IPO using the 10% standard.  
Figure 2 provides another way to look at how firms become widely held over time. In that figure, we 
use the continuous sample to show the change in insider ownership over time relative to ownership at the 
time of the IPO. We exclude all firms that were widely held at the time of the IPO relative to the 10% 
threshold, as they are unlikely to exhibit much change in inside ownership.  The figure also shows that the 
change in insider ownership is much larger in earlier years following the IPO than later. When we split 
the sample period for the continuous sample into two subperiods of similar length, we find similar results 
for both subperiods.  
Another useful way to look at the data is to ask the question of how likely it is for a firm with 
concentrated ownership entering year n after its IPO to become widely held in that year. Table 3 provides 
estimates of such conditional probabilities. The Table includes only firms in the continuous sample as the 
whole sample includes firms that might become widely held in the year or years for which we have no   13
data.  With this sample, the number of firms that could become widely held after year 10 is less than 100 
for each threshold.  
The probability of becoming widely held at the 10% threshold is 10% or higher in only three years. In 
contrast, the probability of becoming widely held at the 20% threshold is 10% or higher in most years. 
This reflects the fact that a firm is much more likely to meet the 20% threshold than the 10% threshold. 
There is no evidence that the probability of becoming widely held decreases monotonically over time, but 
the highest probability is in year 1 for both thresholds. We see that each year we lose firms from our 
sample. Except for the early years, we typically lose more firms than there are firms becoming widely 
held.    
 
4. How do large changes in the ownership share of insiders take place? 
In this section, we investigate the nature of large inside ownership changes and the determinants of 
such changes. As noted by Zhou (2001), insider ownership typically does not change much from year to 
year. In our data, the mode of the distribution of changes is 0%. To understand changes in the ownership 
share of insiders, we therefore analyze how significant changes in ownership take place and firm 
characteristics that are correlated with such changes. We define a significant change in ownership as a 
reduction in the ownership share of insiders of 5% of the firm’s equity or more. We use 5% because it 
corresponds to the regulatory threshold for the definition of a block holding (Rule 13d-1(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act). So, a drop in the ownership share of insiders from 40% to 33% would 
correspond to a significant reduction in insider ownership but a drop from 40% to 37% would not.  
The ownership share of insiders can change because the number of shares held by insiders falls and/or 
because the number of shares outstanding for the corporation increases. To account for the changes due to 
each factor, we use the following decomposition of the change in the ownership share of insiders. Define 
∆αt to be the change in the ownership share of insiders from t to t+1, St to be the number of shares held by   14
insiders at date t, and Nt the firm’s number of outstanding shares at date t. The ownership share of insiders 
at t, αt, is equal to St/Nt.  With this notation, we have: 
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The first term in the last line of equation (1) is the change in α explained by changes in the number of 
shares held by insiders (the numerator of the fractional ownership formula). The second term is the 
change in inside ownership brought about by a change in the number of shares outstanding (the 
denominator of the fractional ownership formula).  
We use equation (1) to understand better how ownership changes. Table 4 shows the distribution of 
significant changes in the ownership share of insiders. We find that both the average and median changes 
in insider ownership are large in years in which insider ownership decreases by at least 5%. In particular, 
the mean decrease is 15%. Using our decomposition, we find that on average the change in insider 
ownership due to sales by insiders is slightly higher than the change in insider ownership due to the 
increase in the number of shares. The number of shares outstanding can increase because of a variety of 
reasons. For instance, it increases when the firm issues shares, when it pays for a merger with shares, and 
when executives exercise stock options. It follows, therefore, that mergers are a less important contributor 
to the reduction of the insider ownership share than sales of shares by insiders. This result contrasts 
sharply with the conclusion of Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2004) for the U.K. The relative importance of 
sales by insiders is greater when we consider medians.  
We also collect information on secondary offerings from SDC.  These are likely to be sales of stock 
by the insiders in a public offering, although they could be sales by blockholders who do not have a seat   15
on the board of directors. To be conservative, we use secondary offerings for the three-year window 
centered on the year of significant insider ownership change. This window ensures that we include all 
secondary offerings that could possibly be related to the change in insider ownership. Using a three-year 
window provides an upper-bound to the change in ownership that can be accounted for by secondary 
offerings. We find that secondary offerings account for a small fraction of the change in inside ownership 
on average.  
To consider more directly the role of share issues and the reason for such issues, we investigate the 
change in shares outstanding brought about by equity issues and mergers around the years in which 
insider ownership changes by more than 5%. We again use a three-year window. We find that shares 
issued through SEOs and mergers represent a small fraction of the increase in shares. This result is 
surprising. An obvious worry is that SDC does not record some of the seasoned issues and mergers of the 
firms in our sample because these firms are too small for their transactions to be noticed.  Thus, we 
investigate whether the results are different if we split our sample into large and small firms. We find that 
Table 4 is very similar if we only include the large firms in our sample.   It seems, therefore, that a more 
likely explanation for our results on SEOs and mergers is that options, private equity placements, and 
convertible conversions play an important role for firms that have recently completed their IPO.  
 
5. Why do firms have large changes in ownership?  
We now consider why firms have large changes in insider ownership that bring them closer to being 
widely held.  Is it because of changes in optimal insider ownership that are consistent with the moral 
hazard and information asymmetry theories discussed in the introduction or because of windows of 
opportunity that enable insiders to sell shares and firms to issue shares at prices they find advantageous? 
In this section, we estimate probit regressions where the dependent variable takes value one if the firm 
experiences a decrease in insider ownership of at least 5% during a period. Therefore, the coefficient on a 
variable that makes it more likely that a firm experiences such an insider ownership decrease should be   16
positive. Note that our regressions include lagged insider ownership as an explanatory variable, so that we 
are examining the relation between the explanatory variables and the probability of a large decrease in 
insider ownership conditional on a given level of insider ownership. The sample uses any IPO firm with 
data on Compustat, CRSP, and Compact Disclosure that is not widely-held at the beginning of the year 
using the 10% threshold.   
The variables that the theories deem important and the proxies we use for them are as follows: 
 
1.  Level of insider ownership. If it is costly for insiders to bear firm risk, they are more likely 
to decrease their holdings if their holdings are large. We therefore expect a positive 
coefficient on this variable.   
2.  Venture capital. VCs typically hold a seat on the board of directors (Baker and Gompers, 
2003), which means they are classified as insiders according to our data source, Compact 
Disclosure.  Given that VCs aggressively cash out within a few years of the IPO (Field and 
Hanka, 2001), IPOs with VC backing would be more likely to experience substantial 
decreases in insider ownership. We expect a positive coefficient on this variable.  
3.  Firm size. We expect larger firms to have fewer information asymmetries. The relation 
between size and moral hazard is unclear. Larger firms are more monitored by institutional 
shareholders, analysts, the press, and regulators. However, they are less likely to be taken 
over and atomistic shareholders find coordination costs prohibitive. We use two size proxies. 
First, we use the logarithm of total assets. Second, we use a dummy variable if a firm has 
market value of equity greater than the 25
th percentile of NYSE firm. The dummy variable is 
used to capture a potential threshold effect where firms become more monitored as they stop 
belonging to the “small-firm” asset class.  
4.  Book-to-market ratio. Lower book-to-market ratio firms have more intangibles, so that the 
information asymmetry theories would predict that such firms should have higher insider   17
ownership. A low ratio could indicate that the firm has high growth opportunities. High 
growth opportunities suggest more discretion on the part of management, which would lead 
to higher optimal insider holdings, but might also correspond to greater alignment of 
incentives between insiders and outside shareholders if insiders are empire-builders, which 
would lead to lower optimal insider holdings (see Stulz, 1990). Finally, window of 
opportunity theories would predict that firms are more likely to become diffusely held when 
their valuation is high.  
5.  Hard assets. We use the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets as our measure 
of hard assets. There is less scope for discretionary spending in firms with more hard assets 
(Gertler and Hubbard, 1993). Moral hazard theories therefore predict a positive coefficient on 
our proxy for hard assets. 
6.  Funding needs. Firms with less operating cash flow and more capital expenditures have 
greater funding needs, so that we would expect insider ownership to drop. Otherwise, if 
insider ownership is maintained constant, the firm is restricted in its ability to raise equity by 
the wealth constraints of the insiders. Further, Jensen (1986) expects higher agency costs for 
firms with higher free cash flow for given insider ownership. We therefore expect optimal 
insider ownership to be higher with higher free cash flow, so that the coefficient on free cash 
flow is expected to be negative both because of moral hazard considerations and because of 
funding considerations.  We use EBITDA as our cash flow measure. For given investment 
opportunities, an increase in EBITDA corresponds to an increase in free cash flow.   
7.  Capital expenditures. Free cash flow falls with capital expenditures, so that we would 
expect firms with higher capital expenditures to be more likely to raise equity and see their 
insider ownership fall. Yet, greater capital expenditures mean more discretion for insiders, so 
that greater ownership would be required to insure that this discretion is used to benefit   18
shareholders. This tension makes the sign of the coefficient on capital expenditures 
undetermined.  
8.  R&D spending.  R&D spending differs from other capital expenditures in that it is associated 
with more managerial discretion and greater information asymmetries. Firms with R&D 
spending therefore should have higher optimal insider ownership (see Crutchley and Hansen, 
1989, and Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia, 1999). We follow Himmelberg, Hubbard, and 
Palia (1999) and use a dummy variable for firms that report R&D spending and a level 
variable which is R&D spending divided by total assets. We therefore expect a negative 
coefficient on a dummy variable that takes value one for firms that report R&D spending and 
a negative coefficient on the level variable.  
9.  Dividends. Dividends reduce the intensity of agency problems by leaving fewer resources 
under the discretion of management and reduce information asymmetries through signaling. 
We therefore expect dividend payers to have lower optimal insider holdings and hence the 
coefficient on a dummy variable that takes value one if a firm pays dividends to be negative.  
10. Leverage. Leverage controls agency problems (see Jensen, 1986, and Stulz, 1990) so that we 
expect more highly levered firms to be more diffusely held in equilibrium. Further, firms with 
high leverage are more likely to be firms that have too much debt, so that we would expect 
them to issue equity. As they issue equity, insider ownership falls, so that these 
considerations suggest a negative coefficient on leverage. However, if insiders are concerned 
about control, they will choose high leverage precisely so that they can afford a large 
proportional stake in the firm’s cash flows, leading to a positive association between leverage 
and ownership (see Stulz, 1988).   
11. Volatility. Volatility reduces the expected utility of insiders for a given stake in their firm, so 
that it makes them more likely to sell. However, volatility should also make them less likely 
to sell since information asymmetries are more important with greater volatility. Some   19
authors also use volatility as a proxy for diversity of opinion and we would expect firms to be 
less likely to increase their float if diversity of opinion is higher.
16 It follows that the 
coefficient on volatility is ambiguous. However, if information asymmetries can be 
neglected, the coefficient on volatility is unambiguously negative. We use the volatility of the 
residual of a one-year market model regression as our measure of volatility.   
12. Turnover. Turnover is often used as a proxy for liquidity. Greater turnover means that the 
market for shares is deeper, so that sales by insiders have less of a price impact and insiders 
are more likely to sell shares.
17 Because volume is measured differently on Nasdaq and on the 
NYSE, we use separate turnover variables for Nasdaq firms and NYSE firms.
18 Note that 
Nasdaq-listed firms represent 86% of the firm-year observations in our sample. 
13. Past and contemporaneous returns. Greater past returns mean that the firm has performed 
well, so that moral hazard considerations imply lower equilibrium insider holdings because 
insiders have built a reputation. Further, high past performance is associated with a deeper 
market for a firm’s stock.
19 Individuals are generally contrarian investors.
20 We would 
therefore expect insiders who do not act on the behalf of institutions to be more likely to sell 
following high returns.  
 
Table 5 compares firm characteristics at the end of year t-1 (except for contemporaneous returns) for 
the firms that experience a decrease in insider ownership of more than 5% in year t with those that do not. 
Strikingly, most differences are significant. Since means can be influenced by outliers, we pay more 
attention to medians. As predicted, we find that firms that experience large decreases in insider ownership 
                                                 
16 See Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) and Baker, Coval, and Stein (2005). 
17 Turnover is sometimes used as a proxy for differences of opinion or information asymmetries (see, for instance, 
Dierkens, 1991, and Chen, Hong, and Stein, 2001). These considerations would predict a negative coefficient on 
turnover. 
18 See Atkins and Dyl (1997). 
19 See Chordia, Huh, and Subrahmanyam (2004). 
20 See, for instance, Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2004) and the references therein.    20
in a given year have more insider ownership the year before, a lower book to market ratio, higher 
turnover, and higher contemporaneous and past returns.
21 The difference in contemporaneous and past 
returns is particularly striking since the firms with significant changes outperform those without such 
changes by more than ten percent in the current year and in the previous year. Firms experiencing large 
decreases in firm ownership are smaller when size is measured by the book value of assets than other 
firms. This is most likely due to the fact that larger firms have lower insider ownership to start with. 
Further, the firms that decrease ownership have a lower ratio of property, plant, and equipment to assets, 
greater volatility, lower leverage, are more likely to report R&D expenses, have higher R&D expenses, 
and are less likely to pay dividends. The univariate comparisons show that capital market variables have 
the predicted effects, but the comparisons for firm fundamentals do not always correspond to the 
predictions. The explanation for the mixed results for the comparisons of the fundamental characteristics 
could be that correlations among these characteristics obscure their true relationship with the probability 
of significant changes in ownership. We therefore turn to multiple regressions to examine whether that is 
the case.     
Table 6 estimates probit regressions to investigate the impact of these variables on the probability of 
firms experiencing sizeable changes in insider ownership. We define a sizeable insider change to be one 
where insider ownership falls by 5% or more for a firm with insider ownership in excess of 10% at the 
beginning of the year. When considering whether a drop in insider ownership of 5% or more takes place 
in the t-th year following the IPO, all our explanatory variables are from year t-1 except for 
contemporaneous firm, industry, and market returns. The other explanatory variables could be directly 
affected in year t by the change in ownership. This seems impossible for industry and market returns and 
the existence of a direct impact on calendar-year firm returns is questionable. It seems reasonable 
therefore to consider our explanatory variables to be predetermined rather than determined jointly with 
the change in ownership. The first regression is a pooled regression that uses all firm-years. The next five 
                                                 
21 Note that the raw sample has firms with negative book-to-market, but these firms drop out as we impose our 
various data requirements so that they are not in the sample used to estimate our regressions.     21
regressions are regression estimates for each year for the first five years following the IPO. The last 
regression uses all firm-years for firms past the fifth year from their IPO. The regressions for the 
subsamples allow the explanatory variables to affect the probability of large changes in insider ownership 
differently depending on the level of maturity of the firm. 
We find that firms with larger insider ownership and firms with venture capital investors are more 
likely to experience a large drop in insider ownership as predicted. Firm size predicts larger drops in 
insider ownership, but this effect seems restricted to the early years only. The dummy variable is never 
significant. Book-to-market always has a negative coefficient which is significant in all years but year 5. 
Property, plant, and equipment is significantly negative in one regression and significantly positive in 
another. Our cash flow measure has a negative coefficient in all regressions, so that insiders not pushed 
by financing needs are less likely to sell shares. Alternatively, it could be that firms with high cash flow 
have more agency problems as in Jensen (1986). However, it seems that the ability to generate cash plays 
a more important role than the demand for cash to invest. Capital expenditures do not affect the 
probability of large decreases in insider ownership. The coefficient on R&D expenditures is positive and 
significant in five regressions, while the dummy variable for firms that report R&D is significantly 
negative in two regressions. Leverage is significantly negative in one regression and significantly positive 
in another. Volatility is significant and positive in year one, but in no other year. Turnover for NYSE 
firms is significant in the pooled regression and in one other regression, whereas turnover for Nasdaq 
firms is significant in all regressions but one. Finally, turning to returns, the firm’s return is always 
positive and significant and the lagged return is positive and significant in every regression but one. The 
contemporaneous industry return is also positive and significant, but the lagged industry return is almost 
never significant. The market return mostly does not seem to affect the probability of large decreases in 
ownership, though the coefficient in the pooled regression is positive and significant for the 
contemporaneous market return.    22
The evidence presented in Table 6 indicates that the initial level of insider ownership, funding needs, 
book-to-market, turnover, and contemporaneous and lagged firm returns are the main drivers of large 
decreases in insider ownership. The other variables, which play a role in the moral hazard and information 
asymmetry theories, are generally not significant.  The message is very much that insider ownership falls 
when the shares trade at a high price relative to the book value of their assets and relative to their past 
value, and when the market for the shares is more liquid. The variables emphasized by the moral hazard 
and information asymmetry theories seem of second-order importance. 
There is a large literature in finance which relates Tobin’s q to managerial ownership.
22 Tobin’s q is 
closely related to the inverse of book-to-market. This literature often focuses on the existence of a non-
linear relation between q and managerial ownership where an increase in managerial ownership leads to a 
higher q at least for low levels of managerial ownership. There is a great deal of debate as to whether q is 
high because insider ownership is high or whether a high q is associated with higher optimal insider 
ownership. Tobin’s q is negatively related to the book-to-market coefficient. In this paper, we therefore 
add a different consideration, namely that a high q leads to a subsequent decrease in managerial 
ownership. At least for firms close to their IPO, this result seems difficult to square with the argument 
that a high q leads to a high optimal amount of insider ownership. 
In Table 6, a firm’s explanatory variables reflect past cumulative changes in these variables. In table 
7, we use instead the lagged change in these variables (i.e., the change from t-2 to t-1) with two 
exceptions. First, returns are flow variables already, so it would make no sense to difference them. 
Second, we keep the level of insider ownership to investigate whether a high level predicts a decrease in 
insider ownership. We do the same for the VC variable. By using lagged changes, we lose the regression 
for year 1 that we were able to estimate in Table 6. The only variables that are consistently significant are 
the level of insider ownership, firm returns, and lagged firms returns, and contemporaneous industry 
returns. The higher a firm’s insider holdings, the more likely the firm is to experience a large drop in 
                                                 
22 See Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) for a review of this literature.    23
insider holdings. As before, firms are more likely to experience a large drop in insider holdings if they 
perform well. None of the variables that proxy for moral hazard problems or information asymmetries are 
consistently significant. The pooled regression that uses the whole sample has mixed results. Increases in 
R&D expenses make it more likely that a firm will experience a large drop in insider ownership in 
contrast to agency theory predictions, but an increase in plant, property, and equipment also makes such a 
drop more likely in conformity with these predictions. Overall, the regressions seem therefore most 
consistently supportive of windows of opportunity theories. However, surprisingly, changes in turnover 
are not significant.  
We explored the robustness of our conclusions by changing the explanatory variables in our 
regressions. We were concerned that market variables are correlated with variables that are important for 
the moral hazard and information asymmetry theories. We therefore re-estimated our regressions without 
any of the market variables. Doing so had no impact on our conclusions. The regressions we report have 
neither time nor industry dummies. We added such dummies, but doing so had no impact on our 
conclusions because these dummies are generally not significant. Finally, we estimated the regressions 
using only one size variable and one R&D variable. Doing so does not affect our conclusions. 
 
6. Estimating the conditional probability that a firm will become widely-held 
In the previous section, we studied the probability that insiders in a firm would decrease their 
proportional holdings substantially. We saw that the evidence is mostly supportive of theories that 
emphasize capital market considerations. Insiders sell when they get a good price and the market for the 
stock is good, causing insider ownership to fall over time.  In this section, we focus on the probability that 
a firm becomes widely held in one year given that it was not widely held the year before. To study this 
issue, we estimate a hazard model.  
A hazard function is similar to a logit function in that it estimates the probability of an event 
occurring.  In our case, we consider the event of becoming widely held, where we define widely held as   24
having less than 10% insider ownership (or, alternatively less than 20% insider ownership).  A hazard 
function differs from a logit in that it combines multiple periods together in one estimation procedure.  
Moreover, the estimation procedure focuses on the conditional probability of becoming widely held (i.e., 
given that the firm was not widely held last period, what is the probability it will be this period?).  Hazard 
functions have been used in a variety of applications in finance, such as estimating the probability of bank 
failure, prepayment of residential mortgages, predicting bankruptcy or default, and of a firm starting an 
ADR program.
23   
One can apply a variety of different hazard function models to estimate the conditional probability of 
becoming widely held.  We apply the proportional hazard function of Cox (1975), which is a semi-
parametric approach that does not specify the parameters of the baseline hazard function.  Rather, the 
approach of a proportional hazard model is to estimate the covariates that shift a baseline hazard function 
up or down.  If a covariate has a significant positive coefficient, it means firms with above average values 
of that factor are more likely to become diffusely held.  Likewise, a significant negative coefficient 
implies a downward shift of the baseline hazard function, or a lower probability of becoming widely held.   
One receives a sense of the baseline hazard function from the data presented in Table 3.  In fact, the 
probabilities in Table 3 constitute what is known as the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the hazard function, 
which is considered a good approximation of the baseline hazard.  The idea of the Kaplan-Meier estimate 
is to report the conditional probability of an event occurring in each interval, where the probability is 
conditional on having survived up to the beginning of the interval.  In the case of the Kaplan-Meier 
estimator, the probability is approximated by the frequency of events.  In our case, it is the fraction of 
firms that become widely held during the interval, conditional on not having been widely held before.   
An important aspect of this calculation involves the use of data from firms that do not provide 
complete data.  Suppose we observe a firm’s inside ownership from the year of the IPO and each year 
                                                 
23 See Lane, Looney and Wansley (1986), Whalen (1991) and Helwege (1996), Schwartz and Torous (1993), 
McDonald and Van de Gucht (1999), Shumway (2001), and Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller, and Stulz (2005). 
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thereafter for five years.  This firm is not widely held at any point while we have data for it and we cease 
to observe its insider holdings after five years.  This is an example of a censored observation.  Censored 
observations contribute to the estimation by being included in the group of firms at risk of becoming 
widely held.   Table 3 shows the number of firms at risk of being widely held at the beginning of the year 
(but are not yet widely held), including firms that may not be observed two or ten years later.  In order for 
this step to be considered proper in the estimation of a hazard function, we must have confidence that the 
censored observations are randomly missing.  For example, we would be very suspicious of a dataset 
where 90% of the observations dropped out the year before they became widely held.  Likewise, we 
would doubt the results using a sample where firms were more likely to drop from the sample the longer 
they were not widely held.  Thus, we consider why we cease to observe firms’ data in the sample after 
some length of time.  The reasons are likely to be bankruptcy, mergers, failure to be included in one of 
our databases (Compact Disclosure, CRSP or Compustat, probably due to size but also possibly due to 
distress), and poor matching of datasets due to identifiers changing over time.  The bankrupt firms cannot 
become widely held if they liquidate; the firms that disappear because of a merger with a public firm may 
become widely held as a result of the acquisition; the firms acquired by a private firm are much less likely 
to become widely held; and the remaining missing observations are probably truly randomly missing. We 
believe the overall impact is a set of missing observations that are random vis-à-vis the probability of 
becoming widely held. 
Table 8 shows the results of the hazard model estimation.  We use the same explanatory variables as 
in Table 6 except for insider ownership. It does not make sense to use insider ownership since our 
dependent variable is a step function of insider ownership. As before, we use the 10% and 20% thresholds 
for the definition of a widely-held firm. We report the number of events and the number of censored 
observations. It is immediately apparent, but not surprising given the results in Table 3, that the number 
of censored observations is large compared to the number of events. For the 10% threshold, 90.39% of the 
observations are censored observations. Recall that variables with positive coefficients shift the baseline   26
hazard function upward, meaning firms with high values of these characteristics are more likely to 
become widely held.   
We first turn to the results that hold irrespective of the definition of a widely held firm we adopt. As 
expected, firms with VC investments, larger firms, firms with a lower book-to-market ratio, firms with 
lower cash flow, firms with greater turnover, and firms with higher contemporaneous returns are more 
likely to become widely held irrespective of the definition of a widely held firm used. However, the 
threshold size variable is never significant. The coefficient on the book-to-market ratio seems inconsistent 
with the claims in the literature that a high Tobin’s q leads to greater insider ownership. Surprisingly, the 
ratio of plant, property, and equipment to assets has a negative significant coefficient. Further, firms that 
report R&D are more likely to become widely held, which appears to be inconsistent with the predictions 
of the moral hazard and information asymmetry models. The coefficient on R&D expenses is not 
significant. The coefficient on dividends is insignificant for the 10% threshold, but significantly positive 
at the 20% threshold.   
The coefficient on leverage is significantly negative. Models that emphasize entrenchment by insiders 
are consistent with a negative coefficient, since in such models insiders would want high leverage so that 
they can afford a large fraction of the votes (see Stulz, 1988). With moral hazard theories, we would 
expect that higher leverage decreases ownership concentration since higher leverage keeps managers on a 
tighter leash (see Jensen, 1986, and Stulz, 1990). The evidence does not seem supportive of these 
theories. However, if high leverage is the outcome of financial distress, insiders would find it costly to 
decrease their ownership shares in a way that decreases leverage because doing so would involve issuing 
equity precisely when the underinvestment problem of Myers (1978) is likely to be severe. From a 
window of opportunity perspective, insiders might also think that their firm is undervalued when leverage 
is high, so that they would be reluctant to take actions that decrease their ownership share.   27
The coefficient on volatility is significantly negative so that high volatility firms are less likely to 
become widely held. Volatility plays a dual role in the theories considered in this paper.
24 High volatility 
forces insiders to bear more risk, which makes it more valuable for them to decrease their stake. However, 
high volatility also means greater information asymmetry and greater managerial discretion, which makes 
it costly for insiders to decrease their stake. Our evidence is consistent with Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
who state that “noisier environments should give rise to more concentrated ownership structures” (p. 
1159). In their empirical work, volatility is positively correlated with ownership concentration. 
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) do not find a relation between ownership and volatility when 
they allow for firm fixed effects, but find a negative relation when they do not. As with our probit 
regression, turnover is strongly positively related to the probability of becoming widely held.  
The contemporaneous return on the firm’s stock is positively related to the probability that the firm 
will become widely held, but the lagged return is not. The insignificant coefficient on lagged return 
suggests that the windows of opportunity theory may not be an important determinant of the probability 
of becoming widely held since with that theory, firms would issue equity and insiders would sell after the 
firm has had high returns, but any strong conclusion should be tempered by the fact that contemporaneous 
returns have a significant positive coefficient. However, if there is an optimal level of insider ownership 
that is not trivial, firms that already have low insider ownership are unlikely to dilute the stake of insiders 
further just because of the existence of a window of opportunity since that might lead them to have too 
little insider ownership. In contrast, firms that have substantial insider ownership may have been waiting 
for the right conditions to dilute the stake of the insiders, but these firms are unlikely to become widely 
held.   
We examined the robustness of our conclusions from the hazard function estimates in a variety of 
ways. In particular, we extended the sample to include firms for which insider ownership data was 
missing up to three years. We also used industry dummy variables and only lagged variables. Finally, we 
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used only one size variable and one R&D variable. Our main conclusions are robust to these alternative 
specifications.  
 
7. Conclusion   
In this paper, we show that insider ownership falls steadily following the IPO. While half the firms 
have less than 20% insider ownership 10 years after the IPO, we have no post-IPO year in our sample 
where more than half the firms have more than 10% insider ownership.  Nevertheless, compared to most 
countries, the fraction of firms with less than 10% of insider ownership is large as it exceeds 30% 10 
years after the IPO.  
Surprisingly in light of the U.K. evidence, a major factor for the evolution of the ownership structure 
of U.S. firms is that insiders sell shares in substantial amounts, so that ownership becomes more diffuse 
about as much because of a reduction in shares held by insiders as because of an increase in shares 
outstanding. Moreover, the dilution that occurs via SEOs and mergers is only a fraction of the total 
dilution associated with increased shares outstanding. 
We use two different approaches to understand why firms become widely held. With the first 
approach, we investigate the determinants of large decreases in ownership. Firms experience such large 
decreases mostly because the stock has a good market. In particular, the firm is highly valued by the 
markets, its stock market performance has been good, and its stock has enough liquidity so that more 
shares can be sold with limited market pressure. Further, when we try to explain the likelihood of large 
drops in insider ownership with recent changes in firm characteristics, the firm’s contemporaneous and 
lagged stock-price changes are the only consistently significant variables. With the second approach, we 
estimate a hazard model that allows us to understand the determinants of a firm’s conditional probability 
of becoming widely held. Again, we find that highly valued firms and high turnover firms are more likely 
to become widely held. With this approach, we estimate the probability that a firm will end up with   29
diffuse ownership. We find that some variables emphasized by moral hazard and asymmetric information 
models significantly affect this probability in the predicted direction, but some do not.   
Our results show that the market for a firm’s stock and its stock’s market performance are critical 
determinants of the evolution of its ownership. One might be tempted to conclude that it is so because 
these variables capture better the extent to which moral hazard and asymmetric information problems 
affect a firm. Such a conclusion finds little support in regressions without market variables, but it is 
possible that the variables we and the literature have used to proxy for moral hazard and asymmetric 
information problems do a poor job of capturing these problems. The evidence is much more supportive 
of a view that insiders sell shares and reduce their holdings when they can do so without putting too much 
pressure on the stock price by selling shares. Whether firms end up with really low insider ownership 
through that process does depend on variables that capture moral hazard and asymmetric information 
problems. Our regressions make stock market liquidity a key determinant of the composition of a firm’s 
ownership. To the extent that liquidity is more easily obtained for smaller stocks in the U.S. than in most 
other countries, our results help understand why firms in the U.S. are more likely to be widely held.    30
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Table 1 
Description of the IPO Sample 
 
The first column shows the number of IPOs in SDC Platinum that went public between 1970 and 2001, 
excluding unit offerings, rights offerings, reverse LBOs, and spin-offs. The second column reports the 
subset of these firms that are in CRSP from 1986 to 2001, excluding utilities and financial firms (based on 
SIC codes reported in CRSP). The third column reports the number of firms with non-missing insider 
ownership information in Compact Disclosure for at least one year over the 1986 – 2001 period. 
   
Year 










requiring one year of 
ownership data 
1970 218 109 27 
1971 238 167 58 
1972 467 365  104 
1973 91  48 16 
1974 8  6 3 
1975 6  5 3 
1976 39  29 10 
1977 27  16 5 
1978 35  27 13 
1979 59  43 21 
1980 125  88 47 
1981 278 223  124 
1982 88  83 46 
1983 521 412  331 
1984 243 175  132 
1985 245 164  143 
1986 524 308  280 
1987 380 227  209 
1988 217  95 90 
1989 172 102  101 
1990 152  96 86 
1991 277 201  198 
1992 419 258  253 
1993 638 382  376 
1994 491 336  331 
1995 485 401  396 
1996 749 587  570 
1997 537 375  367 
1998 352 224  211 
1999 506 400  384 
2000 363 315  301 
2001 107  52 45 





Distribution of the Levels of Insider Ownership Following an IPO 
 
Shares held by insiders as a percent of outstanding shares. The WH10 (WH20) column presents the 
fraction of firms with a percentage insider ownership less than 10% (20%) of total number of shares 
outstanding (widely held firms). The initial sample is from SDC Platinum and covers all firms that went 
public between 1970 and 2001, excluding unit offerings, rights offerings, reverse LBOs, spin-offs, 
utilities and financial firms. Insider ownership is sampled annually from Compact Disclosure from 1986 
to 2001. 
 
   Mean  Q25  Median  Q75  WH10  WH20  Number  of 
Firms 
Year1  38.22  20.57  38.13  55.34 12.43 24.27  3878 
Year3  30.50  12.76  26.46  46.01 19.68 39.77  3460 
Year5  27.27  9.58  21.11  41.48 26.54 48.14  2634 
Year10   24.15  7.52  18.33  35.52  31.73  52.71  958 
Year15   24.57  8.07  18.26  35.28  33.27  54.16  517 
Year20   23.19  6.23  16.59  34.76  37.05  53.57  224 
Year25   20.25  5.02  14.68  29.27  42.86  63.27  98 
Year30   21.83  5.93  16.48  33.95  37.14  60.00  70 
Year32   15.40  4.04  8.88  22.49  50.00  58.33  12 
 
 




Probability that a Firm’s Ownership will Become Diffuse in a Given Year after its IPO 
 
The random variables, 
10 T and
20 T , are defined as the first down-crossing by the percentage of insider 
ownership of the threshold barriers of 10 percent and 20 percent, respectively. The conditional probability 
that a firm will become widely-held over year k, conditional on not being widely held prior to that year, 
} | Pr{
10 10 k T k T ≥ = , is obtained by dividing the number of all firms that become widely held over year 
k by the total number of firms that are ‘k-years old’ and that were never widely held up to this point. The 
sample includes only firms that went public between 1986 and 2001 with non-missing insider ownership 
information from the year of the IPO until they exit the sample. The IPO sample is from SDC Platinum 
and excludes unit offerings, rights offerings, reverse LBOs, spin-offs, utilities and financial firms. Insider 
ownership is sampled annually from Compact Disclosure over the 1986–2001 period. The table also 
reports the total number of firms, the number of firms becoming widely held, and the number of firms 
leaving the sample each year due to censoring. 
  
Year  } Pr{



























1  0.12  3878  482 530 0.24  3878  941 456 
2  0.06  2866  166 635 0.15  2481  362 523 
3  0.07  2065  135 541 0.13  1596  201 418 
4  0.07  1389 93  344 0.13 977 126 232 
5  0.08 952  74  219 0.10 619  64  142 
6  0.05 659  35  181 0.09 413  39  101 
7  0.07 443  30  104 0.10 273  27  64 
8 0.08  309 24 86  0.06  182 11 55 
9 0.05  199 9  72  0.05  116 6  44 
10  0.05  118  6 39  0.06  66 4 25 
11 0.14  73  10  19  0.03  37  1  8 
12 0.07  44  3  7  0.11  28  3  5 
13 0.00  34  0  4  0.10  20  2  3 
14 0.10  30  3  6  0.07  15  1  3 
15 0.05  21  1  6  0.18  11  2  2 
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Table 4 
How Do Large Drops in Insider Ownership Take Place? 
 
A large drop in insider ownership is defined as a drop of at least five percentage points of insider 
ownership defined as the percent of shares owned by insiders. The change in insider ownership is 
decomposed into two parts, the first one due to the change in number of shares held by insiders (changes 
in the numerator of fractional ownership) and the second one due to the change in total number of shares 
outstanding (changes in the denominator of fractional ownership). The fraction of shares sold in 
secondary offerings, as well as the fraction of shares issued in SEOs and to pay for mergers, are obtained 
from SDC. We compute these fractions over a three year window centered in the year for which the firm 















    Changes in numerator  Changes in denominator 


















Mean  -0.15 -0.08 -0.02 -0.07 -0.01 
1%  -0.63 -0.60 -0.28 -0.64 -0.15 
Q1  -0.19 -0.14 0.00 -0.09 -0.00 
Median  -0.11 -0.07 0.00 -0.02 0.00 
Q3  -0.08 -0.02 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
99%  -0.05 0.46 0.00 0.04 0.00   38
Table 5 
Firm Characteristics of Firms Experiencing a Large Ownership Drop and of Other Sample Firms 
 
The initial sample is from SDC Platinum and covers all firms that went public between 1970 and 2001, 
excluding unit offerings, rights offerings, reverse LBOs, spin-offs, utilities and financial firms. All 
variables except contemporaneous returns are measured at the end of the year preceding the large drop in 
ownership. The firm characteristics are: the percentage of insider ownership at the beginning of the year 
(INSD); a venture capital dummy (VC), equal to one if the IPO is venture-capital backed; the logarithm of 
book-value-of-assets (LBVA) in 1970 dollars; an indicator variable for the bottom size quartile based on 
NYSE-breakpoints (SZIND); book-to-market equity ratio (BME); property, plant, and equipment over 
total assets (PPEA); free cash flows (FCF), defined as EBITDA over sales; capital expenditures over 
assets (CEXPA); research and development expenditures over assets (RDA); an R&D dummy (RDIND), 
equal to 1 if the firm has positive Research and Development expenditures for that year; a dividend 
dummy (DIVIND), equal to 1 if the firm has paid a dividend in that year; leverage (LVRG), defined as 
total liabilities over book value of assets; idiosyncratic volatility for year t is the residual from a market 
model regression estimated using daily data for year t (VOLATILITY); average daily turnover for NYSE 
traded stocks and zero, otherwise (TONYSE); average daily turnover for NASDAQ traded stocks and 
zero, otherwise (TONASD); firm-, industry- and market-returns over the previous fiscal year (LAGRET, 
LAGIRET, and LAGMRET); and firm-, industry- and market-returns over the current fiscal year (RET, 











(<5% drop) Diff.Mean Diff.Median
INSD  0.413 0.356 0.386 0.317  0.057*** 0.070*** 
VC  0.464 0.356 0.000 0.000  0.108*** --- 
LBVA  2.757 2.813 2.682 2.769   -0.057**   -0.087*** 
SZIND  0.898 0.889 1.000 1.000  0.009 --- 
BME  0.471 0.648 0.350 0.493  -0.177***   -0.143*** 
PPEA  0.229 0.258 0.156 0.190  -0.029***   -0.034*** 
FCF  -0.099 -0.012 0.088  0.089  -0.087***   -0.001*** 
CEXPA  0.077 0.079 0.049 0.050  -0.001 -0.001 
RDA  0.089 0.062 0.009 0.000  0.027***  0.009*** 
RDIND  0.526 0.469 1.000 0.000  0.057***  --- 
DIVIND  0.169 0.194 0.000 0.000  -0.025*** --- 
LVRG  0.415 0.430 0.377 0.406  -0.015***    -0.029*** 
VOLATILITY  0.048 0.046 0.043 0.041  0.002*** 0.002*** 
TONYSE  0.040 0.043 0.000 0.000  -0.003 0.000 
TONASD  0.717 0.545 0.479 0.356  0.172*** 0.123*** 
LAGRET  0.217 0.089 0.040 -0.051  0.129*** 0.091*** 
LAGIRET  0.179 0.148 0.137 0.110  0.032*** 0.027*** 
LAGMRET  0.164 0.159 0.213 0.213  0.005** 0.000 
RET  0.230 0.067 0.094 -0.065  0.232*** 0.159*** 
IRET  0.163 0.131 0.137 0.096  0.033*** 0.041*** 
MRET  0.145 0.135 0.213 0.213  0.010*** 0.000   39
Table 6 
Determinants of the Probability of a 5% or Greater Annual Drop in Insider Ownership 
 
Probit model parameter estimates of the probability of a 5% or greater drop in insider ownership in a year 
conditional on the insider ownership at the beginning of the year being greater than 10%. The pooled estimates use 
all firm-year observations, whereas “Yr. 6-32” pools data in years 6 though 32. The sample includes all firms in 
SDC Platinum that went public between 1970 and 2001, except unit offerings, rights offerings, reverse LBOs, spin-
offs, utilities and financial firms. The independent variables are: the percentage of insider ownership at the 
beginning of the year (INSD); a venture capital dummy (VC), equal to one if the IPO is venture-capital backed; the 
logarithm of book-value-of-assets in 1970 dollars (LBVA); an indicator variable for the bottom size quartile based 
on NYSE-breakpoints (SZIND); book-to-market equity ratio (BME); property, plant, and equipment over total 
assets (PPEA); free cash flows (FCF), defined as EBITDA over sales; capital expenditures over assets (CEXPA); 
research and development expenditures over assets (RDA); an R&D dummy (RDIND), equal to 1 if the firm has 
positive Research and Development expenditures for that year; a dividend dummy (DIVIND), equal to 1 if the firm 
has paid a dividend in that year; leverage (LVRG), defined as total liabilities over book value of assets;   
idiosyncratic volatility estimated from a market model and based on daily returns (VOLATILITY); average daily 
turnover for NYSE traded stocks and zero, otherwise (TONYSE); average daily turnover for NASDAQ traded 
stocks and zero, otherwise (TONASD); firm-, industry- and market-returns over the previous fiscal year (LAGRET, 
LAGIRET, and LAGMRET); and firm-, industry- and market-returns over the current fiscal year (RET, IRET, and 
MRET). All accounting variables are sampled at the end of the previous fiscal year.  The last two rows report the 
number of firms experiencing a 5% or greater drop (NOBS = 1) and the number of firms that did not experience a 
5% or greater drop in insider ownership (NOBS = 0). (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
  Pooled  Yr.1 Yr.2 Yr.3 Yr.4 Yr.5 Yr.6-32 
Intercept -1.427***  -1.311***  -1.101***  -1.066*** -0.796**  -1.683*** -1.524*** 
INSD  1.402*** 1.100*** 1.416*** 0.693*** 1.148*** 1.536*** 1.149*** 
VC  0.256*** 0.356*** 0.259*** -0.050  0.183**  0.241**  0.170*** 
LBVA 0.043***  0.137***  0.068*  0.030  -0.086**  -0.025  0.024 
SZIND 0.019  0.048  -0.101  0.071  -0.353**  -0.008  -0.009 
BME  -0.310*** -0.733*** -0.230*** -0.169** -0.202** -0.072  -0.230*** 
PPEA  -0.186**  -0.077 -0.300 -0.075 -0.238 0.050  0.014* 
FCF -0.134***  -0.051  -0.120**  -0.124* -0.120* -0.017  -0.091*** 
CEXPA  0.067  -0.174 0.120  -0.100 0.526  -0.081 -0.158 
RDA  0.371***  0.892* 0.654* 0.883**  0.526  -0.202 0.483* 
RDIND -0.083***  -0.092  -0.107  -0.113 -0.321***  -0.178 0.044 
DIVIND  -0.013 -0.005 -0.114 0.125  0.134  -0.053 -0.029 
LVRG  -0.017 -0.099 -0.357**  -0.067 0.097  -0.022 0.417*** 
VOLATILITY  1.210*  4.210**  -1.049  1.015 1.499 1.581 -0.331 
TONYSE  0.177**  0.149 -0.195  0.152 0.549**  0.102 0.132 
TONASD  0.173*** 0.094*** 0.174*** 0.055  0.181**  0.310*** 0.081* 
LAGRET 0.093***  0.124**  0.065  0.138**  0.191***  0.111*  0.112*** 
LAGIRET  0.091*  0.127 0.151 -0.004  0.156 0.043 -0.001 
LAGMRET -0.092 -0.097 0.160  -0.047 -0.042 0.035  -0.207 
RET  0.283*** 0.338*** 0.382*** 0.213*** 0.346*** 0.258*** 0.263*** 
IRET  0.069 0.074 0.038 0.228 0.179 0.299 0.057 
MRET  0.215**  0.331 0.040 0.364 0.093 0.346 -0.042 
NOBS = 1  3,460  849 616 440 333 227 995 
NOBS = 0  9,712  1,147 1,338 1,123 1,051 901  4,152   40
Table 7 
Determinant of the Probability of a 5% or Greater Annual Drop in Insider Ownership Using 
Lagged Changes in the Explanatory Variables 
 
Probit model parameter estimates of the probability for a 5% or greater annual drop in insider ownership conditional 
on insider ownership at the beginning of the year greater than 10%. The pooled estimates use all firm-year 
observations, whereas “Yr. 6-32” pools data in years 6 though 32. The sample includes all IPOs in SDC Platinum 
that occurred between 1970 and 2001, except unit offerings, rights offerings, reverse LBOs, spin-offs, utilities and 
financial firms. The independent variables include the percentage of insider ownership at the beginning of the year 
(INSD); firm-, industry- and market-returns over the previous fiscal year (LAGRET, LAGIRET, and LAGMRET); 
firm-, industry- and market-returns over the current fiscal year (RET, IRET, and MRET); and lagged changes in the 
following variables: the logarithm of book-value-of-assets in 1970 dollars (DLBVA(t-1)); an indicator variable for 
the bottom size quartile based on NYSE-breakpoints (DSZIND(t-1)); book-to-market equity ratio (DBME(t-1)); 
property, plant, and equipment over total assets (DPPEA(t-1)); free cash flow (DFCF(t-1)), defined as EBITDA over 
sales; capital expenditures over assets (DCEXPA(t-1));  research and development expenditures over assets 
(DRDA(t-1)); an R&D dummy (DRDIND(t-1)), equal to 1 if the firm has positive R&D expenditures for that year; a 
dividend dummy (DDIVIND(t-1)), equal to 1 if the firm has paid a dividend in that year;  leverage (DLVRG(t-1)), 
defined as total liabilities over book value of assets; idiosyncratic volatility estimated with daily returns 
(DVOLATILITY(t-1)); average daily turnover for NYSE traded stocks and zero, otherwise (DTONYSE(t-1)); 
average daily turnover for NASDAQ traded stocks and zero, otherwise (DTONASD(t-1)).  All accounting variables 
are sampled at the end of the previous fiscal year. The last two rows report the number of firms that did experience a 
5% drop (NOBS = 1) and the number that did not (NOBS = 0). (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
  Pooled  Yr.2 Yr.3 Yr.4 Yr.5 Yr.6-32 
Intercept -1.390***  -1.349***  -0.968*** -1.241*** -1.587*** -1.359*** 
INSD  1.054*** 1.338*** 0.515*** 0.850*** 1.373*** 0.940*** 
VC  0.259***  0.422***  0.030 0.130 0.207**  0.227*** 
DLBVA(t-1) 0.246***  0.181*  0.245**  0.087  -0.151  0.188** 
DSZIND(t-1)  -0.059 -0.165 0.194  -0.362*  -0.047 -0.021 
DBME(t-1)  -0.082**  -0.173 -0.210*  -0.065 0.057  -0.112* 
DPPEA(t-1)  0.673***  0.137 -0.440  0.712 0.456 0.768* 
DFCF(t-1)  -0.027  0.045 0.054 0.012 -0.027  -0.286*** 
DCEXPA(t-1)  -0.357 -0.447 -0.067 0.597  0.278  -0.254 
DRDA(t-1)  0.699**  0.968 1.713***  -0.518  0.467 -0.428 
DRDIND(t-1)  -0.023  -0.480*  0.019 0.372 -0.309  0.140 
DDIVIND(t-1)  0.014 0.194**  0.054 0.188 0.065 -0.116 
DLVRG(t-1)  -0.014 -0.063 -0.362 0.398  -0.483 0.099 
DVOLATILITY(t-1)  1.620*  -2.175  4.334*  1.336 0.471 1.064 
DTONYSE(t-1)  0.006 -0.061  0.160 0.071 0.198 0.007 
DTONASD(t-1) -0.002  0.038 0.012 0.029 0.086 -0.017 
LAGRET 0.146***  0.052  0.111*  0.216***  0.189**  0.155*** 
LAGIRET  0.024 0.246 0.011 0.104 -0.007  -0.030 
LAGMRET  0.012  0.204  -0.018 -0.080 0.163  -0.183 
RET  0.268*** 0.401*** 0.217*** 0.329*** 0.229*** 0.256*** 
IRET  0.096 0.026 0.284*  0.100 0.268 0.011 
MRET  0.160*  -0.075  0.381 0.143 0.204 0.028 
NOBS = 1  2,294  455 406 287 218 928 
NOBS = 0  7,760  1,045 1,030 887  871  3,927   41
   
 
Table 8 
Hazard Rate Model for the Event of Becoming Widely Held 
 
Estimates of a hazard rate model for the event of becoming widely held, where a firm is defined to be 
widely held if its insider ownership is less than 10% (the first two columns of the table) or less than 20% 
(the last two columns of the table). The sample includes only firms that went public between 1986 and 
2001 with non-missing insider ownership information from the year of the IPO until they exit the sample 
(continuous sample). The explanatory variables are the variables listed in Table 5.  
 
  10% p-value 20% p-value 
VC  0.454 0.000 0.817 0.000 
LBVA  0.203 0.000 0.130 0.000 
SZIND  -0.104 0.489 -0.207 0.106 
BME  -0.781 0.000 -0.600 0.000 
PPEA  -0.626 0.040 -0.826 0.001 
FCF  -0.135 0.025 -0.159 0.000 
CEXPA  0.805 0.198 0.677 0.187 
RDA  0.013 0.972 -0.308 0.309 
RDIND  0.261 0.015 0.249 0.002 
DIVIND  0.008 0.943 0.179 0.040 
LVRG  -0.384 0.061 -0.572 0.001 
VOLATILITY  -8.872 0.003 -7.904 0.000 
TONYSE  0.755 0.000 0.654 0.000 
TONASD  0.192 0.000 0.167 0.000 
LAGRET  -0.079 0.171 -0.058 0.204 
LAGIRET  0.470 0.009 0.727 0.000 
LAGMRET -0.851 0.005 -0.760 0.002 
RET  0.170 0.000 0.168 0.000 
IRET  -0.017 0.921 -0.170 0.206 
MRET  1.011 0.001 0.902 0.000 
Number of events  661    1,081   
Number of 
censored obs.  6,925  5,145  
Likelihood ratio  375.01    687.72   
Chi-square test 
for likelihood 
ratio p-value  < 0.0001    < 0.0001   






Figure 1: Distribution of the percentage annual insider ownership changes. The initial sample is from 
SDC Platinum and covers all firms that went public between 1970 and 2001, excluding unit offerings, 
rights offerings, reverse LBOs, spin-offs, utilities and financial firms. Insider ownership is sampled 
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Figure 2:  Distribution of Insider Ownership Changes Following an IPO. Distribution of insider 
ownership changes (current fraction minus initial fraction of insider ownership) in event time following 
an IPO. We exclude all firms that were widely held at the end of the first year following the IPO (insider 
ownership less than 10%). The initial sample is from SDC Platinum and covers all firms that went public 
between 1986 and 2001, excluding unit offerings, rights offerings, reverse LBOs, spin-offs, utilities and 
financial firms. Insider ownership is sampled annually from Compact Disclosure over 1986 – 2001. 
 
 
 
 